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INTRODUCTION
While academics, policy advocates, and politicians continue to
debate what market mechanism best addresses human-caused
*

Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1984; B.A.,
Middlebury College, 1980.
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climate change, there is a growing likelihood that the United
States’ response will take the form of a cap-and-trade program
seeking to limit greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions reductions.
Cap-and-trade programs, like the American Clean Energy and
1
Security Act passed by the House of Representatives in June 2009,
incorporate tradable emissions rights—essentially tradable rights to
pollute. Because they create economic rights in the global
commons, some environmentalists have principled objections to
2
cap-and-trade. These objections derive doctrinal support from the
public trust doctrine—an ancient notion rooted in both the
common law and in Roman law. Under the traditional conception
of the public trust doctrine, certain public resources, such as
flowing water, shorelands, and the air, are not susceptible of private
ownership but are instead held by the sovereign “in trust” for the
3
benefit of the public.
The global atmospheric climate system certainly falls within the
scope of the broadest conception of public trust assets that
government may not alienate—the atmospheric climate system is,
after all, a component of the “air.” Less certain, however, is the
source and applicability of public trust limits in U.S. law, especially
as to how those limits might apply to legislation at the federal level.
Assuming the public trust doctrine applies to federal legislation
allocating pollution rights in the atmosphere, there remains the
question whether the public trust doctrine presents an absolute
barrier to the grant of pollution rights, or whether it only limits the
scope of such grants without precluding them outright.
This Article concludes that public trust doctrine limits are
applicable to federal legislation since these limits are inherent in
the nature of sovereignty. The contemporary version of the public
trust doctrine that prevails under U.S. law, however, is not an
4
absolute prohibition on the alienation of public lands. A cap-andtrade system for controlling GHG emissions is not irreconcilable
with the public trust doctrine; however, a cap-and-trade program
whose cap exceeds scientifically proven sustainable limits on GHGs
violates sustainability principles implicit in U.S. public trust
1. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
2. See infra notes 54–62 and accompanying text.
3. Branford C. Mank, Standing and Future Generations: Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open
Standing for Generations to Come?, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 83 (2009) (discussing the history
of the public trust doctrine).
4. See infra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
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doctrine. Public trust precepts also provide an interpretational
principle that limits the possibility that tradable emissions rights
might become a form of property entitlement.
Part I of this Article introduces the concept of cap-and-trade and
identifies the benefits and drawbacks of emissions trading, with a
particular focus on the ethical objections to granting a right to
pollute. Part II presents the public trust doctrine and explores the
doctrinal source of public trust limits on governmental action, the
applicability of public trust principles to federal legislation, and the
extension of the federal public trust doctrine beyond the
traditional public trust zone of territorial navigable waters. Part III
assesses the implications that the public trust doctrine, as defined
in Part II, could have on a GHG cap-and-trade program.
I. CAP-AND-TRADE EMISSIONS REGULATION AND GREENHOUSE GASES
Although a cap-and-trade system remains controversial, it appears
to be the form of GHG regulation most likely to be adopted in the
United States. A cap-and-trade system (also known as tradable
emissions rights, or emissions trading) underlies the GHG bill
approved by the House of Representatives in the spring of 2009,
the most recent Senate climate bill, which was proposed by
6
Senators John Kerry and Barbara Boxer, as well as the nascent
international GHG control system adopted in the Kyoto Protocol to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Before addressing the public trust implications of a cap-and-trade
system of GHG emissions control, a basic understanding of capand-trade pollution control schemes, as well as the basic arguments
for and against those schemes, is helpful.
A. What is Cap-and-Trade?
A cap-and-trade emissions control scheme is one of the three
approaches under consideration for domestic control of GHG
emissions. The other two possibilities are direct regulation of
sources (“command-and-control” regulation) or carbon taxes.
Under traditional “command-and-control” regulatory schemes
currently in effect in the United States for water pollution and
major sources of air pollution, government agencies acting under
5. See infra notes 202–04 and accompanying text.
6. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. (2010).
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statutory authority regulate each source of GHGs through a permit
7
system or by industry-wide regulatory requirements. Carbon taxes,
on the other hand, seek to reduce GHG emissions by taxing GHG
generating activity and relying on the resulting economic incentive
8
to reduce these activities.
A cap-and-trade regulatory scheme combines both government
regulation and economic incentive.
Under a cap-and-trade
regulatory scheme, government regulators cap the total permissible
quantity of a pollutant (or related family of pollutants) to be
released in the entire geographic area, divide the cap into smaller
units (pollution allocations), and distribute the allocations, which
9
can then be bought and sold.
Unlike command-and-control
regulatory schemes, this overall cap is not incorporated into
10
individual permits for individual pollutant sources.
Instead,
7. Examples of “command-and-control” regulations currently in effect include the point
source permitting schemes established by both the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a),
1342 (2006), and Title V of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661(a), 7661(c) (2006). Both of
these schemes contemplate individual permits for pollution sources, including specific
pollution limitations established by either federal or state regulatory agencies. The ban on
lead additives in automobile fuels, 40 C.F.R. § 80.22(b) (2010), adopted pursuant to the
Clean Air Act § 211, 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2006), is an example of an industry-wide regulatory
prohibition. In 2007, the Supreme Court held, in a case involving EPA authority to regulate
new automobile emissions pursuant to Clean Air Act § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006), that
GHGs constituted “pollutants” within EPA’s regulatory authority under the Clean Air Act.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007). EPA has since made an “endangerment”
finding, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I), setting the
stage for similar regulatory controls on greenhouse gas emissions. See generally Robert R.
Nordhaus, The Feasibility of Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 53 (2007) (noting that issuing an endangerment finding would allow EPA to impose
carbon dioxide standards for motor vehicles); Daniel Brian, Note, Regulating Carbon Dioxide
Under the Clean Air Act as a Hazardous Pollutant, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 369 (2008); Jonathan
S. Martel, Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Climate Change Law and Litigation in the Aftermath of
Massachusetts v. EPA, 7 DAILY ENV’T REP., Nov. 6, 2007, at 3, available at
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/BNA-Artice_Martel_1107.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, Carbon Tax: Ready for Prime Time?, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL’Y 67, 67 (2008).
9. See, e.g., EPA, Clean Air Markets: Allowance Trading, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/
trading/basics.html (last visited May 13, 2010).
10. Under traditional “command-and-control” regulatory systems such as the Clean Water
Act and the Clean Air Act, environmental regulators are tasked with allocating
environmental quality based emissions caps among individual pollution discharges through a
permitting system. For example, under the Clean Water Act Section 303, a state with waters
that do not meet water quality standards must establish a “total maximum daily load” for
pollutants in that water body. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2006). The State (or the EPA)
must then perform a “wasteload allocation” in order to allocate the permissible maximum
daily load among the pollutant sources. 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.2(h), 130.7(a) (2010). Effluent
limitations based on these waste load allocations must then be incorporated into individual
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tradable pollution allocations are distributed among sources, either
11
free of charge or by government sale or auction. Managers of
12
pollution sources are then free to buy and sell allocations.
In theory, the overall social cost of achieving a certain level of
emissions reductions using tradable allocations is lower than using
13
command-and-control. Cap-and-trade relies on the marketability
of the pollution allocations to encourage emitters with the lowest
14
cost of pollution control to achieve the greatest reductions. The
low-cost polluter will achieve a greater reduction than its
proportional share, so that it may generate credits (or use fewer
15
allocations) that can be sold to the high-cost polluter at a profit.
The high-cost polluter will continue emitting at high levels by
16
paying the low-cost polluter to achieve greater reductions. Under
the command-and-control alternative, both the high-cost actor and
the low-cost actor are required to make the same emissions
17
reductions, resulting in greater overall social cost. While carbon
taxes provide similar social flexibility to cap-and-trade, a cap-andtrade system allows the government to establish a cap, while the
market price for the polluting activity is set by supply and
18
demand. On the other hand, under a carbon tax system, the
permits. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.4(d), 122.44(d) (2010). See generally OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, EPA505-2-90-001, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT FOR WATER QUALITY-BASED TOXICS CONTROL
67 (1991), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/exposure/pubs/efast2refs.htm (follow link
at reference 15 under “reference from main text” section). State or federal regulators must
undertake a similar pollution loading allocation process in order to develop State or Federal
Implementation Plans under section 110 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006). This
section requires regulators to come up with enforceable emissions limitations applicable to
individual sources in order to meet national ambient air quality standards. 42 U.S.C. §
7410(a)(2)(A) (2006). Like the Clean Water Act’s Total Maximum Daily Load program
(“TMDL”) program, a cap-and-trade program would establish an overall cap on emissions,
but unlike the TMDL program, a cap-and-trade program would not require regulators to
allocate the cap among individual emissions sources.
11. EPA, supra note 9.
12. Id. See also ROB JOHANSSON, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW REGULATORY STANDARDS
CAN AFFECT A CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM FOR GREENHOUSE GASES (2009), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/publications (follow link to environment page, then scroll down).
13. Zimmer, supra note 8, at 67; see also JOHANSSON, supra note 12.
14. JOHANSSON, supra note 12.
15. Id.; see also Nat’l Ctr. for Envtl. Econ., Economics of Climate Change,
http://yosemite1.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/pages/ClimateEconomics.html (last visited May
22, 2010).
16. See
EPA,
Cap
and
Trade,
Frequent
Questions,
http://www.epa.gov/capandtrade/faqs.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
17. See Jerry Ellig, The Economics of Regulatory Takings, 46 S.C. L. REV. 595, 599 (1995).
18. See EPA, supra note 16.
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carbon price is set by government, either through agency action or
by legislation, and the market then determines the amount of
19
polluting activity that will occur. Both carbon taxes and cap-andtrade systems force polluters to internalize the economic costs of
20
environmental degradation associated with carbon emissions.
This cost-internalization potential is hailed by members of both the
21
22
economic and environmental communities.
In order to function, a cap-and-trade program must have an
overall cap, include all significant sources of the regulated
pollutant, involve pollutants that are fungible both in their effects
and in the location of their source, have an open market
mechanism for buying and selling allocations, and contemplate
23
strict monitoring and enforcement. An overall cap is the most
basic element of cap-and-trade—without a cap, no emissions
reductions can be achieved and tradable allowances would have no
value. For the cap to be environmentally effective, all significant
sources of the relevant pollutant must be included within the
program. The pollutants involved must be ecologically and
geographically fungible—for a reduction by one emitter effectively
to offset emissions by a second emitter, the second emitter’s
pollution must not have localized impacts outside the geographic
range of the offsetting reductions benefits, and the pollutant that is
reduced must be ecologically equivalent to the pollutant that
24
continues to be emitted. An open market system is necessary to
assure reducers of pollution that they will be able to market and
receive compensation for their excess reductions, and to establish
an appropriate price. Finally, strict monitoring and enforcement is
necessary to ensure that the cap is not violated and that the
allocations are not robbed of their value through cheating.
The most successful cap-and-trade program to date is the Acid
Rain Program of Clean Air Act Title IV, which established and
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
See Zimmer, supra note 8, at 67.
See infra Part I.B.
Id.
See generally A. DENNY ELLERMAN & DAVID HARRISON, JR., EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE
UNITED STATES: EXPERIENCE, LESSONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 4–9
(2003), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/emissions_trading.pdf; James
Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV.
607, 616–17 (2000).
24. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 23, at 611–12; Carol M. Rose, From H2O to CO2: Lessons
of Water Rights for Carbon Trading, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 106–07 (2008).
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achieved a cap on power plant acid rain emissions at fifty percent
of 1990 levels at a cost far below (probably inflated) industry
25
estimates by 2000. Under the Clean Air Act Title IV program,
EPA established a system of tradable SOx/NOx emissions
allowances. Starting in the year 2000, a total cap of 8.95 million
allowances, or approximately fifty percent of the 1990 total
26
emissions level, was set, with each allowance authorizing the
holder to emit one ton of SOx/NOx. Most allowances were
distributed to the existing electrical utilities based on historical
emissions, though a small percentage was held for market
stabilization and auction purposes. SOx/NOx allowances are traded
27
on the Chicago Board of Trade. All large electric generators are
required to hold sufficient allowances to cover their annual
28
emissions for each year, and new generators must purchase
29
allowances in order to begin operation. A utility with emissions
exceeding the utility’s allowance holdings is subject to a fine of
$2,000 per ton and must make up the excess emissions by acquiring
30
allowances the following year.
The Acid Rain Program’s relative success can be attributed to its
compatibility with most of the essential elements of an effective
cap-and-trade program as described above. Acid rain precursors
are fungible both across pollutants (sulfur oxides versus nitrogen
31
oxides) as well as (for the most part) geographically. The trading
program set a relatively firm cap on overall emissions, though
whether that cap was ecologically adequate remains to be seen.
Allowance requirements are monitored and enforced and there

25. 42 U.S.C. § 7651b (2009). See generally AMERICAN BAR ASS’N ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE
1990 CLEAN AIR ACT: EPA SPEAKS 51–57 (1991); Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on
Long Island Sound: Is There a Place for Pollutant Trading?, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 156–63
(1998).
26. See EPA, Clean Air Markets, Acid Rain Program, Basic Information, http://www.epa.
gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/basic.html (last visited May 22, 2010).
27. Chicago Board of Trade, Environmental Products, http://www.cmegroup.com (last
visited May 22, 2010).
28. See EPA, supra note 26.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides can also have localized health impacts, so a
reduction in one geographic area is not perfectly environmentally fungible with a reduction
in another geographic area. See generally Lily N. Chinn, Comment, Can the Market be Fair and
Efficient? An Environmental Justice Critique of Emissions Trading, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 80 (1999).
The acid rain impacts of sulfur and nitrogen oxides, however, are geographically dispersed.
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exists an open, public market for the trading of allowances. The
Acid Rain Program met its goals in emissions reductions, although
several commentators have noted that this reduction was achieved
by the relatively low-cost means of switching to available low-sulfur
fuels rather than reducing energy production, installing expensive
scrubbers,
or
developing
innovative
pollution-reduction
33
technologies.
As many commentators have observed, global GHG emissions,
like acid rain precursors, appear to be an excellent candidate for a
34
cap-and-trade program. GHGs are fungible: a reduction in one
GHG, such as methane, is just as beneficial for reducing global
warming as reducing the global warming equivalent of another
GHG, such as carbon dioxide, once the quantities are adjusted for
35
their relative potencies for promoting global warming. GHGs are
geographically fungible as well, because GHGs are well-mixed in
36
the atmosphere so that there are no local “hotspots.”
GHGs thus satisfy the geographic and ecological fungibility tests
for a cap-and-trade program, and the Title IV acid rain trading
program demonstrates the feasibility of having an open, free
market in emissions allocations (as does the existing GHG trading
program set up in the European Union under the Kyoto
37
Protocol).
Less certain is the ability to capture all significant
32. Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving Toward
Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 399–403 (2009).
33. See, e.g., Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the
Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV.
799, 810 (2008); Richard Schmalensee et al., An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions
Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 53, 59 (1998); Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn From the
Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 79 (1998).
34. See Jason Mathers & Michelle Manion, Cap-and-Trade Systems, CATALYST, Spring 2005,
at 18, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/catalyst/Catalyst-Spring2005.pdf; Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Putting the Market to Work for Conservation: The Evolving Use
of Market-Based Mechanisms to Achieve Environmental Improvement in and Across Multiple Media, 14
PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 156 (2006).
35. See Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change
Legislative Proposal is “Best”?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 123, 148 (2007). As Professor
Carol Rose has noted, however, the fungibility issue becomes more complicated when
carbon trading schemes attempt to assign GHG equivalencies to indirect emissions
reductions such as offsets and clean development. See Rose, supra note 24, at 106–07.
36. Compare Rose, supra note 24 (explaining the properties of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere), with Richard T. Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los
Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y F. 231 (1999)
(bringing attention to a problem that exists with many pollutants being traded and creating
“toxic hot-spots”).
37. See INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N & THE WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE
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sources of GHG emissions globally under an emissions trading
program (as is required for an effective cap-and-trade program),
because of the ubiquity of GHG sources throughout human
activity. And as strong as the economic virtues of a cap-and-trade
program might be, such a program will fail to prevent climate
change if the cap is not set at an ecologically sound level. The jury
is still out on the question of whether the Acid Rain Program has
actually eliminated acid rain impacts on northeastern lakes and
forests. Some places have seen improvements while others have
38
not, and recovery from decades of acid rain will take time. This
39
indicates that the acid deposition cap may have been set too high.
To be effective ecologically, the “cap” in a cap-and-trade program
must be based on an accurate assessment of the level of pollutant
40
that the ecological system can sustain without damage. To achieve
an environmental mitigation goal, the scientific, political, and
regulatory systems must together arrive at the “correct” cap that
exploits the assimilative capacity of the ecological system while
41
avoiding environmental harm. For a cap to be effective, however,
it must be scientifically based on the assimilative capacity of the
global ecosystem. Unfortunately, any GHG cap is more likely to be
established through political negotiation than by scientific
consensus, and the political pressures, both domestic and
international, will work towards setting a cap that exceeds the
42
ecologically efficient level.

CARBON
MARKET
2006
3–5
(2006),
available
at
http://www.ieta.org/ieta/
www/pages/getfile.php?doc ID=1667; EPA, Clean Air Markets 2008 Emissions, Compliance,
and Clean Air Markets Analysis, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/ARP_2.html (last
visited May 16, 2010) (discussing EPA’s Acid Rain Program).
38. James Dao, Acid Rain Law Found to Fail in Adirondacks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2000, at
A1; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED NO. 00-47, ACID RAIN: EMISSIONS TRENDS AND
EFFECTS
IN
THE
EASTERN
UNITED
STATES
(Mar.
2000),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/rc00047.pdf.
39. McAllister, supra note 32, at 412–13, 421–23.
40. See William F. Pedersen, The Limits of Market Based Approaches to Environmental
Protection, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10173, n.17 (1994) (criticizing trading programs that fail to
establish an environmental quality based cap).
41. See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Putting the Market to Work for Conservation: The Evolving Use
of Market-Based Mechanisms to Achieve Environmental Improvement In and Across Multiple Media, 14
PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 159 (2006) (arguing that the water quality cap requires
consideration of pollution carrying capacity of the stream).
42. See generally B. Timothy Heinmiller, The Politics of “Cap and Trade” Policies, 47 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 445 (2007).
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B. Pros and Cons of Emissions Trading
Despite the economic efficiencies that emissions trading offers as
the least-social-cost means of achieving a given environmental goal,
43
emissions trading has its detractors. Arguments for a cap-andtrade approach to GHG emissions include its economic
efficiencies, its inherent promotion of full compliance, and its
relative political palatability. Opponents of cap-and-trade argue
that equivalent efficiencies can be achieved through carbon taxes,
are skeptical about technological innovation claims made by capand-trade proponents, and question the morality of selling rights to
commit an immoral act of pollution. This author concludes that,
on balance, the economic efficiencies and relative political
palatability of an appropriate cap-and-trade regime make it the best
choice for controlling GHGs, at least within the United States.
Emissions trading is lauded as a means to achieve environmental
goals at the least overall cost to industry and, by extension, to
44
society more generally.
In addition to the efficiency gains
achieved by diverting pollution control to the lowest-cost
reductions, some commentators argue that tradable emissions
rights encourage technological innovation by rewarding
entrepreneurs who develop new and cheaper pollution control
45
technologies or pollution avoiding processes with a ready market,
though others argue that a cap-and-trade system actually stifles
technological innovation by enshrining existing low-cost
technologies and failing to up the ante sufficiently to encourage
46
innovation. From the market perspective, Wall Street traders and
hedge fund managers welcome a new commodities market in
tradable emissions rights as a source of trading commissions and
47
private deal-making.
In addition to emissions trading, other
43. See generally Reuven Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change:
Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming Than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 3 (2009).
44. See infra notes 45–53 and accompanying text.
45. See Flatt, supra note 35, at 136; ROBERT STAVINS, CAP-AND-TRADE VERSUS THE
ALTERNATIVES
FOR
THE
AMERICAN
ECONOMY
(2009),
available
at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/analysis/stavins/?p=355.
46. See David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVTL. L. REP.
10094, 10103–05, 10107 (2003); see also David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The
Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 47
(1998).
47. See Leila Abboud, Economists Strike Gold in Climate-Change Fight, AP BUSINESS WIRE, Mar.
13, 2008.
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economic incentives, such as a carbon tax, are proposed as
alternative methods through which equivalent efficiencies can be
48
obtained with lower transaction costs.
Environmentalists are split on the merits of emissions trading on
both practical and principled grounds. Some are enthusiastic
about cap-and-trade. The GHG cap-and-trade controls put forward
in the proposed American Clean Energy and Security Act have
been endorsed by twenty-nine environmental organizations,
including the Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental
Defense Fund, Sierra Club, League of Conservation Voters, the
Nature Conservancy, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and the
49
National Audubon Society. In addition to the arguments based
on economic efficiency and technological innovation, these
organizations support a cap-and-trade approach in part because of
50
its perceived political achievability.
It is worth noting the powerful practical and political arguments
in favor of a cap-and-trade system as a means of controlling global
GHG emissions. In addition to the arguments for entrepreneurial
technology development and the economic efficiency advantages
of emissions trading, other benefits include certainty of
enforcement and political feasibility. Since the value of the
economic rights created by emissions trading depends on adequate
monitoring and enforcement, market forces actually impel full
enforcement of the regulatory regime. Thus, enforcement of limits
imposed by a cap-and-trade system tends to be closer to the full
51
enforcement necessary to achieve environmental quality goals.
Put simply, no one will pay twenty-four euros per ton to emit
carbon dioxide if bootleg emitters who do not purchase allocations
are unlikely to be caught and punished. Purchasers, speculators,
and dealers in emissions credits all have vested interests—
potentially worth billions of dollars—in seeing full enforcement of

48. See generally William A. Pizer, Climate Change Catastrophes (Resources for the Future,
Discussion Paper No. 03-31, 2003), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP03-31.pdf.
49. See
Posting
of
Dr.
Joseph
Romm
to
Climate
Progress,
http://climateprogress.org/2009/06/24/sierra-club-waxman-markey-league-of-conservationvoters/ (June 24, 2009, 15:42 EST).
50. See Envtl. Defense Fund, Cap and Trade: The Best Option, Sept. 22, 2009,
http://www.edf.org/article.cfm?contentID=10380 (last visited May 28, 2010).
51. See Lesley McAllister, Putting Persuasion Back in the Equation: Compliance in Cap and
Trade Programs, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 299, 329–30 (2007).
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52

emissions limits. Many environmental norms go under-enforced
where the only constituency served by enforcement is the
53
environmental community.
The addition of vested economic
interests to the usual array of environmental interests should help
to eliminate discretionary non-enforcement as the underlying
emissions norm.
Some environmentalists, however, are less optimistic about capand-trade. Both Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth opposed the
Waxman-Markey bill, asserting that it would do little to reduce
54
GHG emissions.
On practical grounds, some commentators
question the technology-advancing benefits of emissions trading
programs. David Dreisen argues that emissions trading programs
encourage the “cheap fix” rather than more expensive technology
55
improvements. Other commentators have pointed out that the
Clean Air Act’s Acid Rain Program did not result in new scrubber
technologies or even widespread installation of existing scrubber
56
technology. Rather, it led to a shift in the market to favor low57
sulfur western coal that was already available.
52. See id. at 318; see also Blas Perez Henriquez, Information Technology: The Unsung Hero of
Market-Based Environmental Policies, RESOURCES, Fall/Winter 2004, at 9, 11, available at
http://www.rff.org/Publications/Resources/Documents/152/RFF_Resources_152_infotech.
pdf; see also Richard F. Kosobud, Emissions Trading Emerges from the Shadows, in EMISSIONS
TRADING: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY’S NEW APPROACH 3, 30–31 (Richard F. Kosobud ed.,
2000). The value of the carbon trading market is expected to reach $1.4 trillion by the year
2
2020. Posting of Ben Geman to E Wire, The Hill’s Energy & Environment Blog, Carbon
Emissions Market Could Reach $1.4 Trillion in 2020, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2wire/76637-global-carbon-market-could-reach-14-trillion-in-2010-report (Jan. 19, 2010, 14:25
EST).
53. Cf. William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108,
121 (2005) (arguing that environmental under-enforcement arises from interest group
pressures); Barton Thompson, Jr., Innovations in Environmental Policy: The Continuing
Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 191 (2000) (noting the structural
factors leading to government underenforcement of environmental regulations).
54. See News Release, Greenpeace, Greenpeace Opposes Waxman-Markey (June 25,
2009),
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/press-center/releases2/greenpeace-opposeswaxman-mark (last visited May 16, 2010); Friends of the Earth, We Can Do Better, We Must,
http://www.foe.org/global-warming/we-can-do-better (last visited May 14, 2010). These
organizations do not necessarily oppose any cap-and-trade system in principle, and based
their opposition to the Waxman-Markey bill on perceived weaknesses and loopholes in the
cap-and-trade system it proposes. See also FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, HOUSE GREEN ECONOMY
BILL FALLS SHORT (2009), available at http://www.foe.org/sites/default/files/
WM%20factsheet.pdf.
55. Driesen, Free Lunch Or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change
Convention, supra note 46, at 41–46.
56. See sources cited supra note 33.
57. Id.
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Environmentalists also question the legitimacy of emissions
58
trading programs on ethical grounds. Professor Kirk Junker has
observed that emissions trading programs rest on the flawed moral
premise that there exists a “right to pollute” that can be converted
59
to tradable property rights. A right to pollute is inconsistent with
a right to a clean environment—or, stated another way, a right to a
clean environment implies a duty not to pollute, and is therefore in
direct contradiction with a system based on tradable pollution
60
rights. Tradable property interests have a way of becoming vested
and inalienable over time no matter how clearly the initial property
61
interest is limited. As discussed below, these ethical objections to
tradable emissions rights also draw support from the public trust
doctrine, which holds that certain natural resources, by their very
58. See Robert Hahn & Gordon Lester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA’s
Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 142 (1989); STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE
INCENTIVES? ECONOMISTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 46 (1981) (“For some, it is an issue of
morality: clean air is a basic inalienable right that is not for sale at any price.”); James T.B.
Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful Transferable Rights
Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 370 (1989) (“Some [environmentalists] oppose credit
exchange mechanisms, which implicitly recognize rights to release pollutants into the
environment, based on a belief that harming the natural environment is wrong under any
circumstances, and that putting a price on environmental issues cheapens them by making
them matters of private interest and not matters of public-spirited societal consensus.”);
Norman W. Spaulding III, Note, Commodification and Its Discontents: Environmentalism and the
Promise of Market Incentives, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 322 (1997) (“The significance of the
statement that no one ought to have a market-transferable right to pollute is simply that it
attempts to draw a line between conduct properly relegated to the whims of the marketplace
and conduct properly controlled by other means. The moral consequences of erasing this
line [are] something environmentalists must consider.”).
59. Kirk W. Junker, Ethical Emissions Trading and the Law, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 168
(2006).
60. Id. at 161–70; see also Drury et al., supra note 36, at 269.
61. Even the most absolute of modern rights in real property, the fee simple absolute,
evolved from a restricted feudal license between lord and tenant. The fee simple tenancy
was originally not alienable, and subject to restricted rules of inheritance. See generally 1–13
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 13.01 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2009). Not until the 12th
century were such property rights freely inheritable, and not until the 13th century were they
freely alienable. See id. A modern example of a license vesting into a property right is the socalled “vested rights” doctrine under which a property owner’s building permit matures into
a “vested right.” See generally ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS Ch. 52D (Eric Kelly ed.,
2009). Industry groups have argued in the past, in resisting added procedures for permit
renewals, that “[t]he courts have long recognized that a company operating for a substantial
period of time under a validly issued permit has a vested property right.” See Cheryl Hogue,
Comments on Title VI Guidance Seek Clearer Definitions, Input from More Parties, 29 ENV’T REP.
CUR. DEV. (BNA) 234 (1998). For a general discussion of how temporary government
programs evolve into de facto property rights, see Robert H. Nelson, Private Rights to
Government Action: How Modern Property Rights Evolve, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 361, 368 (1986).

300

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 35:2

62

nature, are not susceptible to private ownership.
As noted, cap-and-trade programs have wider industry acceptance
than other emissions control measures and are thus more likely to
be achievable in a political system where little legislation passes
63
Congress without the approval of industry lobbyists.
Industry
prefers cap-and-trade to a tax or to regulatory limits because of the
flexibility in market mechanisms to avoid expensive controls, and
the relative ease of grandfathering existing emitters by allocating
64
allowances to them.
Like Churchill’s famous aphorism about
democracy, cap-and-trade may also be “the worst form of
Government except all those other forms that have been tried from
65
time to time[.]”
The only other means to control carbon
emissions would be either a traditional command-and-control
66
allocation of permissible carbon emissions or a carbon tax. Either
would be difficult to implement in our political and economic
system.
We have a carbon-based economy. Fossil fuels power the vast
majority of economic activity in this country. Any command-andcontrol system of regulating GHG emissions would require a
governmental agency, or Congress itself, to allocate the currency of
economic activity among different industries and industry
participants. Professor Richard Stewart has famously compared
“command-and-control” regulation to Soviet-style central economic
67
planning.
In essence, a command-and-control system would
68
require a centrally planned economic system. It is unlikely that
62. See infra Part II.
63. See Alan Murray, Why Key Executives are Warming to Legislation on Climate Change, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 7, 2007, at A10. See generally, Christopher H. Schroeder, Global Warming and the
Problem of Policy Innovation: Lessons from the Early Environmental Movement, 39 ENVTL. L. 285,
300–02 (2009).
64. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of
Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1544 (2007).
65. The Official Report, House of Commons (5th Series), Nov. 11, 1947, vol. 444, cc.
206–07.
66. See supra notes 7–42 and accompanying text.
67. Richard B. Stewart, Models for Environmental Regulation: Central Planning Versus MarketBased Approaches, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 547, 547 (1992).
68. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 276 (1997); Bruce A.
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1334
(1985); Stewart, supra note 67, at 547; Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and
International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2087 (1993). Contra Daniel H. Cole & Peter
Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the
Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L.
REV. 887, 887 n.2 (1999) (disputing the characterization of “command-and-control”
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such a system would be economically desirable or politically
palatable.
It is telling that the environmental quality based regulatory
schemes of both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act have
failed to achieve their environmental quality goals even after thirty69
five years of implementation. This failure has been due largely to
the lack of political will to set emissions load levels and to make the
necessary allocations among individual and industrial sources of
70
pollutants.
A carbon tax suffers from similar defects as a means to achieve a
specific level of emissions reductions. A carbon tax works, in
theory, similarly to emissions trading by sending a “price signal” to
71
reduce carbon emissions to the appropriate level. Unlike a capand-trade program, which requires setting the emissions cap at the
proper scientific level to save the planet without overshooting and
imposing unnecessary costs, a carbon tax faces the additional
challenge of determining what level of tax will achieve the proper
72
reduction in GHG emissions. In addition, a moral hazard attaches
to carbon taxes: by creating a governmental revenue stream, the
taxing authorities end up with an interest in continuing some level
of the very activity the tax is supposed to dissuade to avoid losing
73
the revenue stream. A carbon tax at a level necessary to achieve
the eighty-five percent reduction in GHG emissions that scientists
74
agree is essential would not be possible politically. For example,
regulation as Soviet-style market control).
69. Kenneth Murchison, Learning from More than Five-and-a-Half Decades of Federal Water
Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 527, 578–
80 (2005) (noting failure of Clean Water Act to achieve water quality goals); Alan Waltner,
Paradise Delayed—The Continuing Saga of the Los Angeles Basin Federal Clean Air Implementation
Plan, 14 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 247, 248 (1995) (noting California’s failure to meet air
quality standards).
70. Murchison, supra note 69, at 580; see Donald W. Stever, Waste Load Allocation, in LAW
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 13:10 (Sheldon M. Novick et al. eds., 2009) (noting
political difficulties of implementing waste load allocations to achieve water quality
standards).
71. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 43, at 32.
72. See Gary E. Marchant, Freezing Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An Offset Policy for Slowing
Global Warming, 22 ENVTL L. 623, 632 (1992).
73. States’ conflicted positions in tobacco litigation settlements illustrate this moral
hazard, which results from the states’ dependence on revenue streams generated by tobacco
sales. See Myron Levin, News Analysis, States’ Tobacco Settlement Has Failed to Clear the Air, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at C1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2003/nov/09/business/fismoke9.
74. See Terry Barker et al., Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION,
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gas prices would have to rise to many times their current levels to
achieve this reduction, and it is unlikely that any politician would
75
support a gasoline tax that high.
Public resistance to higher
76
gasoline taxes suggests that the public would resist carbon taxes
that would significantly increase energy and transportation costs.
The same political problem may ultimately doom any cap-andtrade system as well, given that the necessary price point to achieve
the reduction would be the same. The difference is that under a
tax, the politically answerable taxing authority sets the price point;
with cap-and-trade, the market sets the price with a supply of
emissions allocations that falls far short of current demand. A capand-trade system might be slightly more palatable, as there may be
less political resistance to a market-based price over a government
tax. Ironically, polling shows that the public in the United States
77
would prefer a carbon tax to a cap-and-trade system.
In sum, there are serious practical and ethical objections to an
emissions trading system for GHG emissions.
The ethical
objections focus primarily on the immorality of selling rights to
perform an act perceived to be immoral—the incremental
destruction of the global climate ecology. Indeed, emissions
trading has been compared to the sale of indulgences by the
Catholic Church in the Middle Ages, allowing sinners to enter
78
heaven. However, there are strong practical reasons to favor such
a system as the only means of controlling GHG emissions that has
any chance of political success. In any event, as a cap-and-trade
emissions control scheme appears to be the most likely form of
GHG regulation, and the ethical objections to such a scheme are
premised, at least in part, on objections to the creation of private
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 39 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-ts.pdf.
75. During the 2008 oil price spike, when gasoline prices in the United States doubled to
$4 per gallon, vehicle miles traveled declined by only 1.8%. See Clifford Krauss, Driving Less,
Americans Finally React to Sting of Gas Prices, A Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2008, at C3,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/business/19gas.html. Clearly, a tax rate
that may be many times the current gasoline prices would be necessary to accomplish the
eighty percent reduction in carbon emissions sought by mid-century.
76. See generally Shi-Ling Hsu et al., Pollution Tax Heuristics: An Empirical Study of
Willingness to Pay Higher Gasoline Taxes, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 3612 (2008).
77. An August 2009 poll found that Americans preferred a carbon tax to a cap-and-trade
system by a two to one margin. See Ben Geman, Is a Carbon Tax Dead?, THE HILL, Dec. 1,
2009, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2-wire/69941-is-a-carbon-tax-dead.
78. See Robert E. Goodin, Selling Environmental Indulgences, 47 KYKLOS 573, 578–87 (1994).
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rights in common public resources that undergird the public trust
doctrine, consideration of the public trust doctrine’s application to
a cap-and-trade emissions scheme is in order.
II. APPLICABILITY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO GREENHOUSE
GAS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS
The public trust doctrine holds that certain resources cannot be
reduced to private ownership. The doctrine’s roots trace back to
late Roman times. According to the Institutes of the Eastern
Roman Emperor Justinian, “[b]y the law of nature, these things are
common to mankind: the air, running water, the sea, and
79
English common law
consequently the shores of the sea.”
incorporated this principle, at least as applied to tidal navigable
waters, holding that while title to the shoreline and navigable water
rested in the King, he held such title in trust for the people, subject
to the right of the public to access the waters for navigation and for
80
fishing. This common law conception of the public trust doctrine
served the public’s interest in free navigation and fishing.
Considerable uncertainty surrounds the scope and effect of the
public trust doctrine in U.S. law. U.S. judicial decisions have
incorporated public trust doctrine into domestic law to varying
81
degrees. Nevertheless, public trust doctrine in the United States
remains amorphous both in its authoritativeness and application.
Scholars disagree on the source of public trust law, whether it
applies to limit federal government action, and whether it applies
82
beyond the traditional public trust assets of navigable waters.
In an influential 1970 article, Professor Joseph Sax linked public
trust doctrine to environmental protection, and argued for the use
of public trust principles as a common law restraint on
83
environmental degradation. The application of this doctrine has
taken root to some degree in the United States as a common law
restraint on environmental degradation, through both its
79. JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, § 2.1.1 at 55 (Paul Birks & Grant McLeod trans., 1987).
80. See ROBERT E. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 182–83 (1967); Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1, 11–14 (1894); MATTHEW HALE, DE JURE MARIS, reprinted in 1 A COLLECTION OF
TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 5–44 (Francis Hargrave ed., 1787); STUART A.
MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE 575, 892 (3d ed. 1888).
81. See infra notes 86–114, 121–48, 161–81 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 115–20 and accompanying text.
83. See generally Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
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procedural and substantive aspects. Procedurally, the public trust
doctrine has been applied to preclude alienation of parklands and
other public trust resources without specific legislative
authorization. Thus, in a leading case, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that a parks commission may not lease a
dedicated natural park preserve for recreational development
84
without explicit legislative authorization. Substantively, the public
trust doctrine has been applied to preclude grants of private
interests in navigable waters or shoreline to the exclusion of public
85
rights of navigation and access.
If the global atmospheric
commons is seen as a public trust resource, these substantive limits
might prohibit or restrict the contours of a cap-and-trade GHG
control scheme that purports to grant private rights in the
atmospheric resource.
An assessment of the implications that the public trust doctrine
for a GHG cap-and-trade program in the United States requires
consideration (if not resolution) of issues surrounding the doctrine
that are still a source of scholarly debate. These surprisingly
unresolved issues include: (1) the doctrinal source of public trust
limits on governmental action; (2) the applicability of public trust
principles to federal legislation; and (3) the extension of the public
trust doctrine beyond the traditional public trust zone of territorial
navigable waters. These issues are necessarily interrelated. To
determine whether public trust doctrine limits federal action, one
must examine its doctrinal underpinnings in order to understand
whether it provides a constitutional limit on the scope of legislation
otherwise within Congress’ Commerce Clause or treaty powers.
Even if public trust limits apply to congressional action, application
to legislation granting private GHG pollution rights would require
extension of the federal public trust doctrine beyond its traditional
arena of navigable waters.
In an attempt to resolve these issues, this Part examines the roots
of public trust doctrine and its application in the United States. It
concludes that the public trust doctrine is a fundamental limit on
sovereign power enforceable through the Tenth Amendment
84. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966). Professor Sax
notes, “[p]ublic trust law is not so much a substantive set of standards for dealing with the
public domain as it is a technique by which courts may mend perceived imperfections in the
legislative and administrative process.” Sax, supra note 83, at 509.
85. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton
St. Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292 (1936).
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reservation of the rights of the people; that the public trust
doctrine, as such, can limit congressional action; and that the
public trust doctrine’s scope extends beyond the navigable waters
to include other public trust assets, like the atmosphere, that by
their nature are administered by the polity for the benefit of the
people and cannot be alienated to private interests.
A. The Roots and Branches of Public Trust Doctrine
A brief consideration of the history and doctrinal underpinnings
of public trust doctrine in the United States helps resolve the
question of its potential application to a cap-and-trade emissions
86
control system. United States public trust doctrine traces its roots
87
through English common law back to the Justinian Code. In the
United States, reflections of public trust principles appear in both
colonial legislation and acts of the early Congresses.
The
Massachusetts Bay Colony’s Ordinances of 1641–1647 granted
riparian landowners rights to build structures below the high water
mark on tidal waters, but explicitly reserved the public trust right of
the public to cross such underwater lands for navigation, fishing,
88
and fowling. Similarly reflecting public trust navigation rights, in
the Northwest Ordinance, Congress declared that the Mississippi
and St. Lawrence Rivers should be “common highways, and forever
89
free.”
The New Jersey Superior Court is credited with the first state
90
articulation of public trust principles in Arnold v. Mundy. In that
1821 decision, the court rejected a claim of trespass brought by the
claimed proprietor of oyster beds located in tidal waters. The court
articulated the public trust principles inherited by the states, as well
as their multiple roots in natural, civil, and common law:
Every thing susceptible of property is considered as belonging to the
86. For an excellent and thorough consideration of the history and development of
public trust doctrine in the United States, see Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the
Public Trust: Some of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 458–62 (1989). See also Patricia
E. Salkin, The Use of the Public Trust Doctrine as a Management Tool over Public and Private Lands,
4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 2–3 (1994).
87. See Wilkinson, supra note 86, at 458–62.
88. See JACK ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF
AMERICA’S COASTS 5–6 (1994).
89. Act of Mar. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (providing for the government of the territory
northwest of the Ohio River).
90. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821); see Wilkinson, supra note 86, at n.103; Mank, supra
note 3, at 85.
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nation that possesses the country, and as forming the entire mass of
its wealth. But the nation does not possess all those things in the
same manner . . . Those things not divided among the individuals still
belong to the nation, and are called public property. Of these, again,
some are reserved for the necessities of the state, and are used for the
public benefit, and those are called ‘the domain of the crown or of
the republic’; others remain common to all the citizens, who take of
them and use them, each according to his necessities, and according
to the laws which regulate their use, and are called common
property. Of this latter kind, according to the writers upon the law of
nature and of nations, and upon the civil law, are the air, the running
91
water, the sea, the fish, and the wild beasts.

This seminal opinion noted the practical difficulties of possession
that interfere with the concept of title in public trust assets, and
also introduced the usufructuary nature of private use of public
trust assets:
But inasmuch as the things which constitute this common property
are things in which a sort of transient usufructuary possession, only,
can be had; and inasmuch as the title to them and to the soil by
which they are supported, and to which they are appurtenant, cannot
well, according to the common law notion of title, be vested in all the
people; therefore, the wisdom of that law has placed it in the hands
of the sovereign power, to be held, protected, and regulated for the
92
common use and benefit.

Since the oyster beds claimed by the plaintiff in Arnold v. Mundy
were, as a fishery, part of the trust held for public benefit, the
Court held that the plaintiff in trespass had not acquired rights to
93
the oyster beds either by colonial grant or by use.
Arnold v. Mundy adopted public trust principles into the common
law of New Jersey as a limit on the scope of a riparian landowner’s
claimed rights to lands under water and an implicit limit on the
sovereign’s power to alienate those rights to private interests.
Subsequent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court federalized this
public trust limit on the alienability of lands under water, though
with considerable ambiguity about the source and authority of
94
these limits. In 1842 in Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, the Supreme
Court applied Arnold v. Mundy to resolve another New Jersey
property dispute concerning ownership of oyster beds in Raritan

91.
92.
93.
94.

Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 49.
Id.
Id.
Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
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95

Bay, apparently as a matter of federal common law. In the 1894
96
case Shively v. Bowlby, the Court applied public trust principles to
limit the scope of a riparian property owner’s rights under a
congressional grant of territorial property, as against the public
trust rights of what subsequently became the State of Oregon. The
Shively decision was grounded in the “equal footing” doctrine—the
idea that all states subsequently admitted to the Union enjoy the
97
same sovereign rights as the original thirteen. Thus, Oregon was
entitled to take sovereign title to its public trust lands on the same
basis as original states such as New Jersey, and the prior
congressional grants were presumed not to compromise the public
trust assets of future states. The Court left open, however, the
possibility that a clearly expressed congressional intention to
98
convey territorial public trust lands would be effective.
Perhaps the most dramatic application of the public trust
doctrine by the Supreme Court (and certainly one of the most
99
cited) came in the 1892 case, Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.
The Illinois legislature had previously granted rights to underwater
lands comprising the entire Chicago waterfront to the Illinois
Central Railroad. A subsequent legislature declared this grant null
and void, and rescinded it. The railroad challenged the rescission
as an unconstitutional taking of its property, and the Supreme
Court upheld the legislature’s rescission, citing public trust
principles as a limit on the nature of title held in lands under
navigable water:
But it is a title different in character from that which the State holds
in lands intended for sale. It is different from the title which the
United States hold in the public lands which are open to preemption
and sale. It is a title held in trust for the people of the State that they
may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over
them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction
100
or interference of private parties.

This passage from Illinois Central has been read, most famously by
Professor Joseph Sax, as establishing public trust limits on

95. The opinion does not explain the source of the legal principles it applies, and cites
state common law cases freely. Id. at 389.
96. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
97. Id. at 26–28.
98. Id. at 57–58.
99. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
100. Id. at 452.
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sovereign states’ power to alienate trust assets.
Professor Sax
reads Illinois Central as a judicial limit on the exercise of the State’s
102
authority to dispose of public trust assets. According to Professor
Sax, “When a state holds a resource which is available for the free
use of the general public, a court will look with considerable
skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated
either to reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject
103
public uses to the self-interest of private parties.”
This reading is problematic. After all, Illinois Central did not hold
unlawful anything the Illinois Legislature had accomplished.
Rather, the Court simply accepted the subsequent legislature’s
recapture of the public trust lands as being consistent with Illinois
public trust principles that prevented the railroad from having
104
acquired valid title in the first place.
The case simply did not
arise in the posture of a public-interested challenge to the grant of
public trust assets to exclusively private interests, and accordingly
does not stand for a robust judicially enforced limit on grants in
violation of the public trust. Rather, the case arose as a claim by
that putative grantee of the public trust asset. The Court’s holding
that the purported grant was voidable by the State is not quite a
holding that the purported grant was void ab initio.
The Supreme Court subsequently characterized Illinois Central as
a simple application of Illinois law governing the scope of rights
that might be acquired in a state grant of public trust lands. In
105
Appleby v. City of New York, the Court rejected a claim that the
public trust principles established in Illinois Central precluded an
effective grant of the state’s public trust interest (“jus publicum”) in
106
lands under water.
The plaintiff in Appleby sought to enjoin the
City of New York from dredging and wharfing boats in a previously
deeded area comprising a limited portion of the Hudson River
waterfront. In rejecting the City’s public trust defense to a federal
Contract Clause claim, the Supreme Court limited Illinois Central to
the situation where a state sought to divest itself of a substantial
107
portion of the public trust resource.
The Court further
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Sax, supra note 83, at 489–90.
Id.
Id. at 490.
Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 462–63.
Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926).
Id. at 396.
Id. at 393–94.
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characterized Illinois Central as a statement of Illinois common law,
not a statement of federal principles limiting the permissible scope
108
of state action.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions similarly treat public trust
principles as state empowerment, not as a limit on state sovereign
action.
For example, in a 1994 case, Phillips Petroleum v.
109
Mississippi, the Supreme Court applied public trust doctrine to
uphold Mississippi’s claimed right to grant oil and gas leases as
against those claiming title to the underlying lands, even while
extending the scope of public trust lands to include non-tidal
110
navigable lands.
Commentators have likewise viewed the public
trust doctrine as one that may empower states to regulate coastal
111
environmental resources free from liability for takings claims.
Under this view, public trust doctrine is one of the “background
principles” of common law that inhere in title and limit the rights
for which a property owner may seek compensation under the
112
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Court has
generally eschewed any claim that public trust doctrine constitutes
a federal limit on the alienability of public trust resources,
explaining, instead, that the federal “equal footing” doctrine places
public trust lands equally in the ownership of each state at the
outset, subject to each state’s disposition of the public trust assets
113
according to its own common law rules. According to the Court
in Phillips Petroleum, states can “define the limits of the lands held in
public trust and . . . recognize private rights in such lands as they
114
see fit.”
Despite this dictum by the Supreme Court, many commentators
continue to view public trust doctrine as one that limits the scope
of permissible State alienation of trust property. The leader among
these academics is Professor Joseph Sax, who argued in 1970 that
public trust doctrine would be a fruitful vehicle to enforce
108. Id. at 395 (referring to Illinois Central as a case which “arose in the Circuit Court of
the United States, and the conclusion reached was necessarily a statement of Illinois law”).
109. Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
110. Id. at 479.
111. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 367 (2005);
Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1442 (1993).
112. See sources cited supra note 111.
113. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 472–74.
114. Id. at 475.
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environmental values through existing common law doctrine.
Other commentators have taken up Professor Sax’s call to rely on
public trust doctrine to advance environmental values judicially,
while expanding the doctrinal basis of the public trust from
common law to constitutional status. These commentators have
relied on various constitutional and federalism doctrines to support
the notion that public trust principles are of national dimension
116
and are thus superior to contrary state law.
Thus, Richard
Epstein has argued that public trust limits on state action inhere in
Equal Protection principles, as well as in the converse of the
Takings Clause: grants of unequal rights to public resources
deprive other persons equal protection of the law, and the same
principle that requires compensation for the taking of private
property precludes inadequately compensated grants of public
117
assets.
Other commentators have placed the source of public
trust limits in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution as an
aspect of the implied guarantee of free navigation underlying
118
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
Others define the public
trust doctrine as a vestige of federal common law, permissible in
the absence of federal legislation even after Erie Railroad v.
119
Tompkins and Swift v. Tyson.
One commentator finds federally
enforceable public trust limits in natural law incorporated through
penumbras and emanations of the Ninth Amendment to the
120
Constitution.
The Illinois Central decision explicitly grounded public trust limits
115. See generally Sax, supra note 83. For a critique of Sax, see Richard Lazarus, Changing
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine,
71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 643–44 (1986); see also, e.g., 1 W. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
AIR AND WATER § 2.20, at 162 (1986) (arguing for strict scrutiny of state actions affecting
public trust resources); Susan Morath Horner, Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing Life into the Public
Trust in Wildlife, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 23, 41–49 (2000) (arguing for extension of public
trust doctrine to protect wildlife); Julian C. Juergensmeyer & James B. Wadley, The Common
Lands Concept: A “Commons” Solution to a Common Environmental Problem, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J.
361, 377–79 (1974); Wilkinson, supra note 86, at 426 n.3; Mary Turnipseed et al., The Silver
Anniversary of the United States’ Exclusive Economic Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse,
and the Possibility of a Blue Water Public Trust Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 47–50 (2009); Hope
Babcock, Grotius, Ocean Fish Ranching, and the Public Trust Doctrine: Ride ’Em Charlie Tuna, 26
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 54–60 (2007).
116. See infra notes 117–20.
117. See Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 422–28 (1987).
118. See Wilkinson, supra note 86, at 458–62.
119. Turnipseed et al., supra note 115, at 47–48; Babcock, supra note 115, at 11.
120. See generally George P. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and
Natural Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307 (2006).
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in notions of state sovereignty, holding that “[t]he State can no
more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are
interested, like navigable waters and soils under them . . . than it
can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government
121
and the preservation of the peace.” Some observers draw on this
language to suggest that public trust principles are enforceable as
122
While Illinois Central
inherent essentials of state sovereignty.
relied on this inherent attribute of state sovereignty to limit the
permissible scope of alienation of trust assets, other Supreme Court
decisions have similarly relied on essential principles of state
123
sovereignty to empower states under public trust principles. The
idea that public trust limits and powers inhere in the very nature of
sovereignty is one consistent thread in public trust cases.
The Supreme Court relied on such unwritten notions of
sovereignty, not incorporated by any specific constitutional
provision, to strike down congressional legislation imposing duties
124
on state officers in Printz v. United States.
Public trust principles
have been described as an essential attribute of sovereignty across
125
126
cultures and across millennia. Therefore, the Court’s reasoning
in Printz—that essential attributes of state sovereignty limit
congressional impositions—equally supports the notion that
similarly essential aspects of government sovereignty, such as the
public trust doctrine, provide a limit on government alienation of
trust assets. This limit is equally enforceable as part of the social
contract underlying the constitutional bargains of federalism and
popular sovereignty. This notion finds textual support in the
Tenth Amendment’s reservation of rights not granted to the
127
federal government “to the States respectively, or to the People.”
The Supreme Court has also suggested the existence of
inherently sovereign rights of “the people” that are not abrogated
121. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
122. See James M. Kearney, Recent Statute Closing the Floodgates? Idaho’s Statutory Limitation
on the Public Trust Doctrine, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 91, 115–16 (1997) (citing Ariz. Ctr. for Law in
the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)); see also Turnipseed et al.,
supra note 115, at 44–46 (arguing that public trust duties inhere in sovereignty).
123. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 283 (1997); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
124. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997).
125. See Wilkinson, supra note 86, at 429–30 (recounting that public rights of water use,
including navigation and fishing, are recognized in Asian, African, and Islamic societies).
126. See JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, supra note 79.
127. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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by the role of states in the federal system. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
128
v. Thornton, the Court held that the Tenth Amendment only
reserves to states those sovereign powers in existence at the time of
founding of the United States, and that it reserved to the people
those aspects of sovereignty not residing in the states. Thornton
struck down a state attempt to add to the constitutional
qualifications for members of Congress, holding that no such
aspect of sovereignty existed at the time of the nation’s founding,
129
and thus no such right was reserved to the states.
The decision
thus provides additional support for the notion that there exist
enforceable norms limiting the scope of sovereign powers, and that
reservation of state sovereignty by the Tenth Amendment does not
abrogate pre-existing rights of the people. Since public trust
doctrine is a pre-existing limit on the scope of state sovereignty,
Thornton suggests that the pre-existing rights of the people in trust
assets—at a minimum, rights to navigation and fishing—are
reserved by the Tenth Amendment.
Like the inherently sovereign right of “the people” to choose the
qualifications of their representatives, public trust limits inhere in
sovereignty, and these limits are reserved to the people.
B. Public Trust Doctrine Limits on Federal Legislative Action
The public trust doctrine has implications for a congressionally
enacted GHG cap-and-trade program only to the extent that the
public trust doctrine places limits on federal legislative actions. If
public trust doctrine only restricts the authority of individual states
to alienate public trust assets, then congressional action would be
immune from any challenge based on public trust principles.
Whether the public trust doctrine applies to federal legislative
action remains an open question. The Supreme Court’s doctrine
has, to date, arisen solely in the context of states’ rights to public
trust assets, leading some to suggest that congressional action is
130
immune from the limitations under the public trust doctrine.

128. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (holding that the Tenth
Amendment only reserves to states those sovereign powers in existence at the time of
founding of the United States, and reserves to the people those aspects of sovereignty not
residing in the States).
129. Id. at 801–02.
130. See Eric Pearson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Federal Law, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 173, 175 (2004); Lazarus, supra note 115, at 633–34.
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Lower courts have reached conflicting conclusions about the
application of the public trust doctrine to federally acquired
131
lands. Commentators, however, urge the extension of the public
132
trust to actions of federal agencies and Congress. The extent to
which the public trust limits federal action turns on the question
addressed in the previous section: what is legal source of those
limits? If the public trust doctrine is solely a matter of common
law, then Congress may vary those limits at will, at least within the
scope of Congress’ enumerated powers. If, on the other hand—as
this author believes—the public trust is essential to the nature of
sovereignty and encompasses rights reserved to the people
generally, then the doctrine applies equally to the sovereign federal
government as it does to the sovereign state governments.
Those who suggest that public trust does not apply to federal
legislative action draw support from the doctrine’s ambiguous
precedential background. First, the development of public trust
doctrine has been almost entirely in the context of public trust
133
limits and powers of states. Phillips Petroleum suggests that under
the “equal footing doctrine,” all states inherit the same public trust
134
baseline assets. Following that baseline, however, each state may
develop its own law and doctrine establishing the scope and limits
135
One commentator has thus suggested that
of the public trust.
there is not one public trust doctrine in the United States, but
rather fifty-one public trust doctrines—one for each state plus a
136
federal doctrine. The Supreme Court has never determined the
existence of a federal public trust doctrine as a limit on
congressional action; nonetheless, in cases like Shively v. Bowlby it
has applied public trust principles to interpret the scope of
137
congressional grants.
Second, lower federal courts have reached conflicting
conclusions about the existence of federal public trust
responsibilities. Three noteworthy decisions directly address the
issue: two suggest that the federal government holds public trust
assets subject to the traditional public trust in navigation and
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See infra notes 138–45.
See infra notes 146–50.
See supra Part II.A.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. State, 484 U.S. 469, 486 (1988).
Id. at 483 (quoting Shivley v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894)).
See Wilkinson, supra note 86, at 425.
See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
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fishing access, while another rejects this trust limitation. In U.S. v.
138
1.58 Acres of Land, the District of Massachusetts held land that the
federal government acquired by condemnation to build a Coast
Guard station was taken subject to the state public trust, preserving
public rights to access for fishing and navigation below the high
139
water line.
The Northern District of California followed this
140
reasoning in City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards, holding that the
federal government takes title to tidelands subject to public trust
responsibilities and may not convey such tidelands to a private
141
party.
Contrary to this result, another Northern District of
California decision, United States v. 11.037 Acres, held that under the
142
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution the federal government
condemns and eliminates all property interests when it takes state
143
land, including public trust interests.
Other federal courts have considered the public trust doctrine,
applying its principles to empower federal agencies to protect
communitarian public trust values rather than placing limitations
on federal action. Thus, a federal district court held that the
federal government shares in the responsibility to protect public
trust interests in wildlife, permitting the federal government to sue
for natural resource damages where an oil spill killed 10,000
144
migratory birds.
Other federal authorities have located federal
control over use and disposition of navigable waters in the Property
Clause of the Constitution, even in the absence of federal
145
ownership of the underlying lands. These authorities suggest that
public trust doctrine has some bearing on federal actions, though
they do not stand directly for restrictions on federal action.
Despite this ambiguous precedential background, many
commentators argue for application of public trust principles to
138. U.S. v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 121 (D. Mass. 1981).
139. Id. at 124–25.
140. City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards, 635 F.Supp. 1447 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
141. Id. at 1450.
142. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2.
143. United States v. 11.037 Acres, 685 F.Supp. 214, 216–17 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
144. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980).
145. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 22, 38–39
(1947); General Regulations for Areas Administered by the National Park Service and
National Park System Units in Alaska, 61 Fed. Reg. 35,133, 35,134 (July 5, 1996) (to be
codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 1, 13) (asserting Commerce and Property Clause jurisdiction to
regulate waters in National Parks where the United States does not hold title to submerged
lands); see generally Turnipseed et al., supra note 115, at 43–44.
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federal actions involving public trust resources.
Recent
commentary has urged the extension of public trust principles to
limit exploitation of fishery resources and aquaculture in ocean
146
waters under federal control beyond the territorial sea.
Other
commentators have urged application of public trust principles to
147
federal programs as diverse as national parks administration and
148
the broadcast radio spectrum.
The resolution of the question discussed in the preceding
Section—the provenance of public trust doctrine—bears on
whether the doctrine applies as a judicially enforceable limit on the
scope of federal action. A public trust doctrine born of state
common law, or as an implied Dormant Commerce Clause limit on
149
the exercise of state power, would not pose any limits on the
scope of permissible federal action. A public trust doctrine rooted
in federal common law, or as a fundamental concept of sovereignty
enforceable as part of the basic constitutional political contract,
should be federally enforceable. As discussed in the previous
section, this author believes public trust limits are inherent in the
nature of sovereignty and are therefore enforceable as limits on
150
federal action.
Nevertheless, such application of public trust doctrine to limit
federal action would be a judicial innovation. As noted earlier,
federal courts have yet to strike down any federal legislative or
151
regulatory action as a violation of public trust principles.
Some
observers question whether public trust doctrine limits federal
152
action at all, while those arguing for expansion of the doctrine
153
cannot agree on its doctrinal underpinnings. Some courts resort
to public trust concepts in evaluating issues of environmental law
without considering whether public trust doctrine creates any

146. See Turnipseed et al., supra note 115, at 52–58 (describing fishery resources);
Babcock, supra note 115, at 54–60.
147. See generally Peter Egan, Applying Public Trust Tests to Congressional Attempts to Close
National Park Areas, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 717 (1998).
148. Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 547–50 (2002);
Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natural Resource
Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 285 (2004).
149. See supra Part II.A.
150. Id.
151. See supra Part II.B.
152. See generally Pearson, supra note 130; Lazarus, supra note 115.
153. See supra Part II.B.

316

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 35:2
154

judicially enforceable limitations on federal action.
These
authorities suggest that public trust principles might be a form of
“soft” law, providing guidance rather than enforceable limits. Even
if the public trust doctrine is not a “hard” law enforceable limit on
federal action, public trust principles may still be brought to bear
on the acceptability and the interpretation of a cap-and-trade
system of tradable rights to the atmosphere’s GHG absorption
capacity. Whether or not treated as “hard” law, the public trust
plays a role in the construction and interpretation of putative
grants of public assets. Thus, the Supreme Court in Shively v.
Bowlby relied on public trust principles to find that Congress had
not, through pre-statehood legislation, granted private rights to
155
tidelands in Oregon.
Similarly, some states, such as
Massachusetts, have adopted a public trust doctrine that is
essentially procedural, requiring a “clear statement” in the form of
an explicit authorization of the alienation in question for a
legislative grant of private interests in public trust assets to be
156
effective.
Public trust principles might thus form a rule of
construction for a cap-and-trade program, limiting the scope of any
private rights obtained.
Finally, even if not binding, public trust principles provide a
useful metric for assessing the appropriateness of a cap-and-trade
program in light of evidence of their acceptance in various cultures
and throughout history. Public trust is as frequently invoked as a
moral or ethical principle as it is a legal one, particularly in the case
of legacy, cultural, and environmental resources. The ethical
argument proceeds on the principle that no given generation of
lawmakers and government has the authority to compromise legacy
resources that have been enriching humanity for generations and
157
to which future generations have an equal claim.
Thus, public
trust principles have been invoked to protect works of art, cultural
158
artifacts, archeological treasures, and paleontology resources.
154. See supra notes 138–45 and accompanying text.
155. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
156. See, e.g., Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966).
157. See generally Mank, supra note 3.
158. See, e.g., Wis.’s Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res., 340 N.W.2d 722 (Wis.
1983) (stating public trust doctrine applies to historical resources); Wade v. Kramer, 459
N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (stating archeological remains are subject to public trust
protections); San Diego County Archaeological Soc’y, Inc. v. Compadres, 146 Cal. Rptr. 786
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (rejecting claim that the public trust doctrine should be extended to
cover archeological remains located on private property); Ellen R. Porges, Protecting the Public
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Whether or not public trust limits are legally binding in a way that
prevents Congress from adopting a cap-and-trade system of
allocating GHG pollution allowances, the cultural and
environmental legacy underpinnings of the ethical public trust
argument apply with political and moral force to any congressional
undertaking in this area.
C. Extending the Federal Public Trust Doctrine Beyond Navigable
Waters to the Atmosphere
Traditionally, the federal public trust doctrine has been applied
solely to trust interests in navigable waters and associated
159
tidelands. Thus, application of public trust principles to a federal
cap-and-trade program depends on expansion of the doctrine to
cover air resources implicated in management of the global climate
system. Even though the federal public trust doctrine has not been
judicially extended beyond navigable waters and tidelands, the
160
doctrine’s Justinian roots explicitly included rights in the “air.”
State judicial decisions have already extended public trust interests
well beyond the arena of navigable waters to resources such as
161
parks, archeological sites, and water resources.
Many
commentators urge that federal public trust doctrine should
162
likewise be extended.
Under English common law, public trust responsibilities were
163
limited to tidal waters.
The United States Supreme Court
extended the doctrine to include waters that were navigable but
not tidally influenced, including the vast reaches of the Great Lakes
164
and America’s freshwater river systems.
In Phillips Petroleum, the
Court also extended the doctrine to include lands underlying
Interest in Art, 91 YALE L.J. 121, 122 (1981) (arguing for public trust interest in preserving the
integrity of art work). See generally William Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust:
Process-based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive
Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 402 (1997); Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and
Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559
(1995).
159. See supra notes 138–45 and accompanying text.
160. See JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, supra note 79, at 55.
161. See infra notes 167–70.
162. See, e.g., supra notes 111–12, 115–20 and accompanying text; infra note 170.
163. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12 (1821).
164. See Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374
(1977); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1877); Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53
U.S. 443, 451 (1852).
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waters that are tidal, but non-navigable. No federal decision has
yet made the leap from waters to other potential trust resources, at
least in the absence of a statutory scheme incorporating trust
166
principles.
State decisions, on the other hand, have extended public trust
responsibilities well beyond the high tide mark and common law
trust interests in waters, fishing, and navigation. This expansion
has been both physical and conceptual. Physically, states have
expanded the application of public trust doctrine from the near
shore, such as beach access, to water resources unrelated to
navigation and to resources such as public parkland having nothing
167
to do with water at all.
Some states have gone even further,
applying public trust principles to environmental and cultural
heritage resources, such as the unique ecosystem of Mono Lake in
168
169
California and archeological remains.
States also apply public
170
trust principles to wildlife resources.
Along with this geographic expansion of public trust principles
beyond the water’s edge, states have expanded communitarian
interests subject to the public trust beyond the immediate
utilitarian interests in commercial navigation and fishing. Thus,
courts have recognized the preservation of tidelands as a public
171
trust value, as well as the recreational interests in access to
165. Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 489–92 (1988).
166. Cf. In re Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980) (applying
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601
(2006)). See also Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(applying the doctrine to protect areas surrounding redwood forests based on the National
Park System Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1–18 (2006), and Redwood National Park Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
79a–79q (2006)).
167. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984)
(holding that public access to dry-sand beach was part of the public trust right to access to
water); see also Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1055
(N.Y. 2001) (stating parks are “impressed with a public trust for the benefit of the people”);
see also In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445–47 (Haw. 2000) (applying public
trust doctrine to all water in the state), aff’d in part and vacated on unrelated grounds in part by
In Re Water Use Permit Applications, 105 Haw. 1 (2004).
168. See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419 (Cal. 1983).
169. See generally Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that
archeological remains are subject to public trust protections).
170. See generally People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374 (Cal. 1897) (recognizing fish as
public trust resources); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d
588, 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (finding public trust includes wild birds); Michael C. Blumm &
Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The American Rule of Capture and State
Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 655, 693–96 (2005).
171. See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251 (1971); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d
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172

navigable waters.
The leading case is the California Supreme
Court decision in Marks v. Whitney, where the court held that the
reserved public trust interest precluded development of a marina
in tidelands that had been granted to a private owner by the state.
The court specifically recognized environmental services as public
trust values:
The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible
to encompass changing public needs. In administering the trust the
state is not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one
mode of utilization over another . . . . There is a growing public
recognition that one of the most important public uses of the
tidelands—a use encompassed within the tidelands trust—is the
preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may
serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as
environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine
173
life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.

These cases recognizing the ecosystem service values of public trust
resources are particularly relevant to application of public trust
principles to a cap-and-trade scheme. Just as the California
Supreme Court considered the pollution control and habitat values
of tidal wetlands to prevent development of those wetlands that
would impair those public benefit functions, a court may consider
the overall carbon cycling functions of the global atmospheric
ecosystem in assessing whether over-allocation of emissions rights
would impair this ecological system.
These state court cases, as well as the origins of public trust
doctrine, support extension of public trust principles to include
atmospheric resources. The state common law origins of the
public trust doctrine trace the doctrine’s roots to the Institutes of
the Emperor Justinian; recall that Justinian’s statement of the
public trust principle specifically included “the air” among the
174
assets held in common for the benefit of all mankind.
While
English common law may have limited its recognition of public
761, 769 (Wis. 1972).
172. See, e.g., Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 92 N.Y.2d 591 (1998) (finding
preservation of recreational use of stream previously used for commerce is a public trust
value); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972)
(holding that recreational use of beach falls within the public trust); Marks, 6 Cal. 3d at 259–
60 (finding trust purposes include hunting, bathing, and swimming); Orion Corp. v.
Washington, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072–73 (Wash. 1987) (stating public trust interests include
swimming, water skiing, and other recreational purposes), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988).
173. Marks, 6 Cal. 3d. at 259–60.
174. See JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, supra note 79, at 55.
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trust resources to navigable tidal waters, United States decisions
did not hesitate to extend the doctrine to non-tidal navigable
waters based on the exigencies of the new world.
Moreover, the navigable waters development of public trust
doctrine at common law was not necessarily a limit on the scope of
potential trust assets. Public trust doctrine has been based on the
idea that public trust assets were “res communes,” that is, they were
simply physically incapable of being converted to private
176
ownership. Once the res communes became susceptible to private
177
ownership, but as yet unappropriated (so-called res nullius), the
potential limitations on private ownership under the public trust
doctrine became relevant. For example, as waters were privatized
the public trust doctrine restrictions on these assets were
178
applicable.
Similarly, as governments seek to privatize rights to atmospheric
assets through tradable emissions rights, the public trust doctrine
should naturally extend to protect previously unpossessable
interests in the atmosphere commons.
Indeed, while the Supreme Court has not explicitly applied
public trust doctrine beyond its common law boundaries of tidal
and navigable waters, it has recognized public trust-like rights in
airspace. The federal airspace public trust doctrine evolved, in
part, from recognition of an implied federal navigational easement
179
through navigable waters.
Sixty years ago, in United States v.
Causby, the Supreme Court recognized a navigational servitude in
the airspace above private property, much like the navigational
175. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12 (1821).
176. See generally Carol M. Rose, The Public Domain: Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators:
Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (2003).
177. Id.
178. Arnold v. Mundy and Illinois Central are both examples of cases where public trust
principles were called into play by an assertion of private rights in navigable waters that were
previously not subject to such ownership.
179. See generally Benjamin Longstreth, Note, Protecting “The Wastes of the Foreshore”: The
Federal Navigational Servitude and its Origins in State Public Trust Doctrine, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
471 (2002); Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1
SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976); Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common
Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don’t Hold Water, 3 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 511 (1975); James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal
Footing and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1997); Michael L. Rosen, Public
and Private Ownership Rights in Lands Under Navigable Waters: The Governmental/Proprietary
Distinction, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 561 (1982); Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign’s Ancient
Prerogative Becomes the People’s Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195 (1980).
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servitude applied by the public trust doctrine to waters overlying
180
privately owned submerged lands.
Causby held that a property
owner could not enjoin aircraft flights over his property, even
though such a navigational servitude was certainly unknown at
181
common law.
Thus, Causby represents the evolution of public
trust-like principles to adapt to technological and social changes
that made usable what was previously unpossessable (and unoccupiable).
D. Inclusion of Atmospheric Resources in the Public Trust
As technology, and the potential for cap-and-trade, makes aspects
of the atmosphere subject to private ownership, the public trust
doctrine should similarly evolve to include these interests in the
public trust responsibilities of the sovereign, such as creating the
system of private rights. The Justinian statement of public trust
principles, which included the air and wild animals as well as
182
“running water,” may have been as much a descriptive statement
of human lack of dominion over these resources as a prescriptive
statement of government’s legal disability to dispose of them. As
civilization exercises increasing dominion over the Justinian list of
trust assets, the law has developed to enforce societal expectations
in the commonality and permanence of these public resources.
The concept of tradable emissions rights is just the latest in a
series of juridical rights in previously un-allocated resources.
Whether denominated as property grants or not, tradable
emissions rights bear all the classical hallmarks of a property
interest: they entitle the owner to a bundle of rights, specifically
the right to emit a specified amount of GHGs. Like traditional
property interests, they have an element of exclusivity—their value
depends in part on their scarcity. Tradable emissions rights
without a scarcity-creating “cap” would have no value, as the value
of an emissions allowance comes from the right to engage in
conduct that would otherwise be prohibited. And like traditional
property interests, they are tradable. The fact that these rights are
a “new” form of property likewise does not exclude them from
public trust consideration, as public trust doctrine has developed,
in part, to protect previously communal assets from encroachment
180. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
181. Id. at 260–61.
182. See JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, supra note 79.
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by similarly “new” property rights in lands under water.
The fact that emissions allowances are a human technological
construct does not render them any less a property interest, nor
does it necessarily defeat their treatment as public trust assets. The
existence of tradable emissions rights may depend on technologies
allowing for measurement, monitoring, and enforcement of these
emissions and rights. However, the existence of rights in lands
under water at some point depended on the (much simpler)
technology of filling in tidelands and enforcing rights to exclude
people from areas that were previously navigable. As noted, the
public trust doctrine in the New World expanded from tidal
waterways to all navigable waters because of the extensive network
of non-tidal waters essential to navigation that would otherwise be
183
immune from public trust protection.
The Supreme Court has
recognized a public trust-like interest of the public in air
navigation, in derogation of pre-existing common law property
184
rights.
It is not a great leap to include individual atmospheric
emissions allocations, as would be created under a cap-and-trade
regulatory scheme, within the ambit of quasi-property grants that
might conflict with the communal, previously unallocated interest
in the air.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC TRUST FOR A GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM
Thus, in its broadest conception, the public trust doctrine may be
a legal handle for principled objections to the creation of tradable
property rights in air pollution allocations. Emperor Justinian
included “the air” in his list of common resources absolutely not
185
subject to private ownership. Professor Kirk Junker has suggested
that public trust doctrine might be a means of enforcing ethical
186
objections to emissions trading schemes. Professor Gerald Torres
relied on public trust principles to argue that under a cap-andtrade scheme, government must not give away pollution
allocations, but, as trustee, must account for the “profits” implicit in
the sale or transfer of such allocations by collecting the market

183.
184.
185.
186.

See In re Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F.Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980).
See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, supra note 79.
Junker, supra note 59, at 162.
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187

value of such allocations.
At the extreme, a public trust argument against emissions trading
would hold that tradable pollution rights are simply illegal as a
violation of the public trust in the air resources and the absolute
inalienability of this public trust resource. However, the mature
public trust doctrine that is established in the United States is not
this extreme. As the above review of the doctrine’s development
suggests, the public trust doctrine has never been applied in the
United States as an absolute prohibition against alienation of
188
public trust resources. Likewise, the Supreme Court, in Appleby v.
City of New York, made clear that legislative grants of land under
water and private filling of these waters to create developable land
is permissible so long as the rights granted do not substantially
189
interfere with public trust values.
In the Illinois Central case as
well as others, the public trust doctrine has been applied only to
preclude the alienation of a substantial portion of the public trust
asset to private hands. Like the converse situation of public
regulation of private lands, grants of public trust assets are invalid
190
only when they go “too far.”
Therefore, even though the public trust doctrine does not
preclude the use of tradable pollution limits, the doctrine does
have implications for the cap-and-trade proposals currently on the
table to the extent that they go too far, or not far enough. So,
when does the purported grant of a public trust resource offend
the public trust doctrine? There is a legacy principle at work
here—an attempt to alienate public resources goes “too far” when
it deprives future generations of essential, irreplaceable resources.
Thus, the grant of a limited area under water to build a pier, or to
fill land for a development, is not a violation of public trust
(Appleby), but the grant of the entire shoreline of a city (as in Illinois
Central), depriving future generations of any opportunity to
develop piers and navigation facilities, is a violation of public trust.
The grant of water rights in general does not violate public trusts,
but the grant of water rights to the extent that a unique and
irreplaceable natural resource like Mono Lake will be destroyed
187. Torres, supra note 148, at 560–65.
188. See supra Part II.
189. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 401–03 (1926).
190. See Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922). But cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–28 (1978) (establishing balancing test for determining
when public regulation constitutes a taking).
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does violate public trust.
Indeed, the Mono Lake decision, National Audubon Society v.
191
Superior Court of Alpine County, hints at an instructive analogy.
Even while rejecting an absolute application of public trust
principles, in favor of a balancing test, the Court noted that “[t]he
state must have the power to grant non-vested usufructuary rights
to appropriate water even if diversions harm public trust uses” in
192
describing the water rights that might be validly conveyed.
This
reference to usufructuary rights suggests that, although the state
may allocate the sustainable fruits of public trust assets, it may not
allocate rights in the underlying resource itself. To put the matter
in conventional trust terms—the sovereign, as trustee, may
distribute the income of public trust assets, but may not sell off the
corpus.
This view of the public trust doctrine brings an element of
sustainability and intergenerational equity to the limits imposed by
the public trust. The ethical and political arguments for current
action to control GHG emissions are founded on similar notions of
193
intergenerational equity. Under this manifestation of public trust
principles, the sovereign may alienate portions of the resources
held in public trust, but may not do so to the extent that the
alienation interferes with the essential legacy attributes that make
the resource a public trust. Under this conception of the public
trust doctrine, there is no absolute objection to creating a cap-andtrade program and it permits partial alienation of resources held in
public trust. However, since this alienation cannot interfere with
essential legacy attributes, the cap in the program must be set at an
194
ecologically sound level.
This section will explore the

191. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983).
192. Id. at 426.
193. See generally Edith Brown Weiss, Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity and
International Law, in IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON
PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 345–51 (1989), reprinted in 9 VT. J. ENVTL L.
615 (2008).
194. The issues of what levels of carbon dioxide equivalencies in the global atmosphere
and what global temperature increase are sustainable is beyond the scope of this Article.
This Article uses the IPCC Targets for a 2° Celsius change as a proxy for sustainability,
although some have argued that this is even too great an increase. See generally
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT
(2008), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. This
Article, however, does not argue for a “right” to a given atmospheric condition; rather, it
argues for a sustainability limit on how we divvy up and sell the atmospheric commons.
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usufructuary and sustainability principles underlying public trust
law. Then, it applies these public trust principles to GHG cap-andtrade, defining the limits that public trust places on it.
A. The Usufructuary Thread in Public Trust Law
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the term “usufruct” means
“[t]he right to use another’s property for a time without damaging or
diminishing it, although the property might naturally deteriorate
195
The definition of usufruct thus has a built-in
over time.”
sustainability principle: the holder of usufructuary rights can only
exploit the fruits of the property, and must not under any
circumstances impair the productivity of the underlying asset.
Usufructuary rights should thus be sustainable in perpetuity. The
interest is analogous to the interest of an income beneficiary of a
conventional trust: the trustee may pay out the “profits” of the
trust, but must not invade the corpus.
This term of trust law has been used to describe the limits on
exploitation of public trust assets since the founding of the United
States. In a 1789 letter to James Madison, Thomas Jefferson
rejected the possibility that one generation might bind or
compromise the interests of future generations, insisting,
I set out on this ground, which I suppose to be self-evident, “that the
earth belongs in usufruct to the living” . . . For if [a member of the
present generation] could, he might, during his own life, eat up the
usufruct of the lands for several generations to come, and then the
lands would belong to the dead, and not to the living, which would be
the reverse of our principle . . .196

Similarly, the first New World judicial decision establishing public
trust principles, Arnold v. Mundy, invoked the usufruct principle.
According to Mundy, public trust assets “are things in which a sort
197
of transient usufructuary possession, only, can be had.”
More recent authorities, in addition to the Mono Lake decision,
continue to invoke the idea that only the usufruct of public trust
assets may be allocated to private interests. For example, in
declaring water resources generally to be subject to public trust
principles, the Hawaii Supreme Court explicitly relied on “the

195. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1542 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added).
196. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1958).
197. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 49 (1821).
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king’s authority to ‘enforce the usufructs of the land for the
198
common good . . . .’”
Similarly relying on this principle of
usufruct, the Hawaiian Supreme Court subsequently held that the
grant of water rights was a grant of the usufruct only, and that
ownership of the water in the streams remained in the state as a
199
public trust asset for the common benefit.
B. The Sustainability Principle Underlying Public Trust
These invocations of the usufruct principle in public trust law
reveal a larger principle of sustainability and intergenerational
equity underlying the administration of public trust assets. Indeed,
the root of the term “usufruct” itself represents a form of
intergenerational equity, as a “usufructuary” title to land at Roman
200
Other public trust decisions in the
law was a life estate only.
United States similarly incorporate sustainability principles as limits
on the scope of private rights in public trust assets, including even
interests in land. For example, in applying public trust principles
to uphold limits on the development of wetlands, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court explicitly referred to sustainable development
practices:
Is the ownership of a parcel of land so absolute that man can change
its nature to suit any of his purposes? The great forests of our state
were stripped on the theory man’s ownership was unlimited. But in
forestry, the land at least was used naturally, only the natural fruit of
the land (the trees) were taken. The despoilage was in the failure to
look to the future and provide for the reforestation of the land. An
owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the
essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for
which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights
of others. The exercise of the police power in zoning must be
reasonable and we think it is not an unreasonable exercise of that
power to prevent harm to public rights by limiting the use of private
201
property to its natural uses.

The Mono Lake decision likewise invoked environmental heritage
resources as an interest served by the public trust doctrine, and
required that these heritage interests of future generations be
protected, noting that:
198. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 311 (Haw. 1982).
199. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1339 (Haw. 1973).
200. N. Stephan Kinsella, A Civil Law to Common Law Dictionary, 54 LA. L. REV. 1265
(1994) (arguing civil law defines “life estate” as “usufructuary”).
201. Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 769 (Wis. 1972).
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[T]he public trust is more than an affirmation of a state power to use
the public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the
duty of the state to protect the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes,
marshland and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only
in rare cases where abandonment of that right is consistent with the
202
purposes of the trust.

These decisions, which invoke the principles of usufructuary rights
and “common heritage,” demonstrate that there is a sustainability
principle at work in the public trust doctrine. Under these
decisions, actions of a legislature or state agency at any given time
must not deprive future generations and legislatures of their
freedom of action or of their right, equal to the current
generation, to sustainable fisheries, commercial navigation, and,
according to later decisions (e.g., Marks and Marinette County), a
203
sustainable ecosystem.
In Illinois Central, the Supreme Court
made this intergenerational limit explicit, stating that “[t]he
legislature could not give away nor sell the discretion of its
successors in respect to matters, the government of which, from the
204
very nature of things, must vary with varying circumstances.”
Similarly, other courts have made this intergenerational aspect of
the administration of public trust assets explicit. Citing Edmund
Burke, one New York court upheld government regulation of
groundwater on the principle that the government was “merely
discharging [its] obligation under the societal contract between
‘[t]hose who are dead, those who are living and those who are yet
205
to be born.’”
Conflicts between the interests of the current generation and
those of future generations are well documented in trust law.
202. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983) (emphasis
added).
203. Several commentators have likewise argued that ecosystem sustainability principles
underpin (or ought to underpin) the public trust doctrine. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman,
Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working Change from Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN
ENVTL. L.J. 223, 228 (2006); Turnipseed et al., supra note 115, at 18; Babcock, supra note 115,
at 23; Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Wildlife Trust: A Reinterpretation of Section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 605, 612 (2004); Donna Christie, Marine Reserves, the
Public Trust Doctrine and Intergenerational Equity, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 427, 433 (2004);
Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment
for Present and Future Generations (Part 1): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39
ENVTL. L. 43 (2009).
204. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 460 (1982); see also City of Alameda v. Superior
Court of Alameda County, 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980) (holding that the legislature cannot give
away discretion so as to leave future legislature with no trust resources to work with).
205. W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. New York, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1012 (Sup. Ct. 1998).
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Trustees must routinely preserve trust assets for future beneficiaries
206
even against the demands of current beneficiaries.
The same
concern for intergenerational equity underlies the moral and, to
some extent, legal arguments for limiting GHG emissions. Such
limits would be construed as necessary to preserve a hospitable
planet for future generations who will otherwise suffer the effects
of excessive GHG generation without enjoying the economic
207
benefits.
The Framework Convention on Climate Change explicitly relies
on principles of intergenerational equity as the basis for actions
limiting GHG emissions: “[p]arties should protect the climate
system for the benefit of present and future generations of
humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
208
capabilities.” If, as appears to be the case, public trust principles
encompass sustainability and intergenerational equity concerns,
and if, as also appears likely, a government system of property
rights in atmospheric resources implicates public trust concerns,
how then should public trust analysis respond to a GHG cap-andtrade system?
C. Application of the Public Trust Sustainability Principle on the
Allocation of GHG Emissions Rights Through a Cap-and-Trade
Scheme
Government grants of tradable emissions rights in GHG
pollutants invoke public trust concerns—such a system of tradable
rights operates like property rights in the global atmosphere—but
the public sale of “air” is specifically contemplated and rejected in
the Justinian concept of public trust. At the same time, however,
206. See generally ARCHER ET AL., supra note 88, at 3, 38–39; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
79 cmt. c (2007) (describing duty to balance competing interests of current and
future beneficiaries).
207. See, e.g., James C. Wood, Intergenerational Equity and Climate Change, 8 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (1996); Weiss, supra note 193, at 345. Because future generations do not
enjoy any representation in the current day legislature and political system, the interests of
unrepresented future generations in preventing catastrophic climate change present a
strong argument for judicial intervention in the political process under a “representation
reinforcement” theory of judicial review. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980); Matthew Tuchband, The Systemic Environmental Externalities of Free Trade: A
Call for Wiser Trade Decisionmaking, 83 GEO. L.J. 2099, 2105–06 (1995).
208. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.237/18 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992), at art. 3.
OF TRUSTS §
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the U.S. application of public trust doctrine generally does not
preclude the sale of public trust assets to private interests. Rather,
as explained in Part II, such a sale is prohibited only when it
deprives the public of an entire public trust resource or future
decision makers of the same resources and choices enjoyed by the
current decision makers. Under this conception of the public trust
doctrine, no system of allocations can be valid if the cap exceeds
the requisite sustainable level of global emissions that avoids
catastrophic climate change.
1. Public Trust Principles Do Not Preclude All Cap-and-Trade
Schemes
At the outset, it is clear that the public trust doctrine prevalent in
the United States should not preclude all forms of cap-and-trade
systems for GHG emissions. While there remains a principled
209
objection to granting private property rights to “air,”
the
Supreme Court and all of the States have long made clear that
limited grants of public trust resources are permissible. From cases
such as Appleby and even Mono Lake, it is evident that while public
trust principles may limit the scope of a state grant of public trust
interests, it does not preclude such a grant altogether. As the
California Supreme Court put it, “[t]he state must have the power
210
to grant non-vested usufructuary rights . . . .”
The key to
consistency of such a grant with the public trust is its
sustainability—does the grant allocate such a large portion of the
public trust resource to current interests that it deprives future
generations of the equivalent environmental benefits enjoyed by
the current generation?
2. Public Trust Principles and Over-allocations
Under the sustainable usufruct view of the public trust, all capand-trade proposals currently under consideration are
unacceptable, since all contemplate phase-in periods during which
209. I use “air” in quotes because an emissions trading system does not create specific
property rights in air. However, such a system would create undivided, tradable interests in
the atmospheric commons that would certainly be considered a form of property. See Carol
M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation,
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 297 (1996) (analogizing tradable emissions rights to traditional
property rights); Turnipseed et al., supra note 115, at 64 (describing property rights in
individual fishing quotas).
210. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).
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tradable emissions allocations would exceed the levels determined
by global scientific consensus to be necessary. The IPCC concluded
211
that a fifty to eighty-five percent reduction is necessary by 2050,
and more recent reports suggest that even greater reductions will
be required. Under the first implementation period of the Kyoto
Protocol (2008–2012), emissions allocations were based on
212
achieving only a five to eight percent reduction from 1990 levels.
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, of which New York State is
a part, contemplates a mere ten percent reduction from 1990 levels
of GHG emissions by power utilities with 25 MW or greater
213
generating capacities by 2019.
The failed Lieberman-Warner
climate bill would have had phased emissions reductions starting at
four percent in 2012 and increasing to seventy-one percent in
214
2050.
The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,
passed by the House of Representatives and awaiting action by the
Senate, contemplates similar reductions of three percent below
215
2005 levels by 2012 and twenty percent below 2005 levels by 2020.
Each of these cap-and-trade schemes contemplates decades of
allocation of GHG emissions rights that are far in excess of the
IPCC determined maximum sustainable emissions. In essence, the
sovereign “trustee” would invade the public trust “corpus” to make
distributions in excess of the sustainable yield of the atmospheric
“trust.” By over-allocating these quantities of GHG emissions to the
current generation of emitters—and by explicitly demanding that
the 2050 generation vastly reduce GHG emissions and cope with
the climate changes induced by the current generation’s
emissions—deprives future legislatures of the choices enjoyed by
the current legislature, just as surely as the grant of the entire
Chicago waterfront to the railroad deprived future Illinois
legislatures of the flexibility of making appropriate decisions about
commerce and navigation to serve the public interest.
As these excess allocations violate the legacy preservation

211. See Barker et al., supra note 74, at 39.
212. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 12, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add.1, art. 3, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
213. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, RGGI FACT SHEET, available at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI_Executive%20Summary_4.22.09.pdf.
214. The Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong. §
1201(d) (2008).
215. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 702
(2009).
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principle of the public trust doctrine, no scheme with such excess
allocations should be valid. As the responsibilities under the public
trust doctrine are inherent in the nature of sovereignty, a court that
reviews such congressional action should strike it down as beyond
the powers of the national legislature, just as the courts struck
down congressional attempts to draft state officials in enforcement
216
of federal programs as beyond the inherent limits of sovereignty.
The fundamental problem with each of these schemes is that the
current generation of sovereign actors would attempt to
compromise the freedom of choice, actions, and atmospheric
resources available to the next generation. This problem cannot
be solved even by an international agreement such as the Kyoto
Protocol and its eventual successor agreement, as the fundamental
value reflected by public trust is not a question of whether a
sufficiently broad constituency of current actors accedes in the
violative grant. Rather, the problem is one of non-representation
of future generations in the disposition of essential legacy
217
resources.
This defect cannot be solved even if every current
sovereign nation on the planet agreed to the over-allocation.
More problematic is the question of how the public trust
doctrine’s sustainability principle should be applied to the
domestic laws of a single nation, such as the United States, that is
just one of many nations engaged in a pattern of GHG emissions
218
that is collectively unsustainable.
Public trust review of the
domestic law of one nation then requires a determination of what
level of emissions may be considered sustainable for an individual
nation in the context of the possibly uncoordinated actions of
other national actors. Much has been written about just systems of
219
international allocation of a sustainable GHG limit.
Allocation
216. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
217. See generally Mank, supra note 3; see also Weiss, supra note 193, at 345–51.
218. See supra Part III.B.
219. See generally Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits be
Allocated on a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51 (2009); Albert Mumma & David Hodas,
Designing a Global Post-Kyoto Climate Change Protocol that Advances Human Development, 20 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 619 (2008); Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should
Pay?, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 18–34 (2007) (discussing corrective and distributive
justice theories); Lukas H. Meyer & Dominic Roser, Distributive Justice and Climate Change: The
Allocation of Emission Rights, 28 ANALYSE & KRITIK 223 (2006); Benito Muller, Varieties of
Distributive Justice in Climate Change, 48 CLIMATIC CHANGE 273, 277 (2001); Eric Neumayer, In
Defence of Historical Accountability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 33 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 185, 187–
88 (2000); EDWARD A. PAGE, CLIMATE CHANGE, JUSTICE, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS (2006)
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theories range from allocations based on per capita emissions,
221
and allocations based on existing aggregate emissions,
to
allocation systems incorporating compensatory over-allocations to
adjust for the economic advantages developed nations enjoyed
while using up the reserve GHG assimilative capacity of the global
222
atmospheric system.
Resolution of the question of what
international allocation system is appropriate is well beyond the
scope of this Article, and is not likely to be necessary to address the
sustainability of any of the existing cap-and-trade proposals. This is
so because cap-and-trade proposals that defer any substantial
reductions until the next generation fail the test of sustainability
under even the most generous (from the U.S. perspective) system
of allocations. Even if the United States were assumed to continue
a share of sustainable global GHG emissions based on its current
(examining climate change through lens of distributive justice).
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AL., GLOBAL WARMING IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD (1991); TOM ATHANASIOU & PAUL BAER, DEAD
HEAT: GLOBAL JUSTICE AND GLOBAL WARMING (2002); DONALD A. BROWN, AMERICAN HEAT:
ETHICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE TO GLOBAL WARMING, 203–24
(2002); PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION 35–36 (2002); Ann P.
Kinzig & Daniel M. Kammen, National Trajectories of Carbon Emissions: Analysis of Proposals to
Foster the Transition to Low-Carbon Economies, 8 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 183 (1998); Juliane
Kokott, Equity in International Law, in FAIR WEATHER? EQUITY CONCERNS IN CLIMATE CHANGE
173, 188 (Ferenc L. Toth ed., 1999); Hermann E. Ott & Wolfgang Sachs, The Ethics of
International Emissions Trading, in ETHICS, EQUITY AND INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 159, 168 (Luiz Pinguelli-Rosa & Mohan Munasinghe eds., 2002) (“The
equal right of all world citizens to the atmospheric commons is therefore the cornerstone of
any viable climate regime.”); Ambuj D. Sagar, Wealth, Responsibility, and Equity: Exploring an
Allocation Framework for Global GHG Emissions, 45 CLIMATIC CHANGE 511 (2000); Sven Bode,
Equal Emissions Per Capita over Time—A Proposal to Combine Responsibility and Equity of Rights
(Hamburg Inst. of Int’l Econ., Discussion Paper No. 253, 2003), available at
http://purl.umn.edu/26240; see also J. TIMMONS ROBERTS & BRADLEY C. PARKS, A CLIMATE OF
INJUSTICE: GLOBAL INEQUALITY, NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS, AND CLIMATE POLICY 144–46
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CHANGE (2008); Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Michael Finus, Permit Trading and Stability
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share of aggregate emissions, the sustainable levels of GHG
emissions would be no more than twenty percent of 1990 U.S.
223
emissions.
Proposals that call for a cap in excess of this level
represent an unsustainable rate of emissions for the United States
taken individually. An allocation scheme based on per-capita
global allocation would require much greater reductions in U.S.
emissions.
Current cap-and-trade proposals thus fail the sustainability test
and are inconsistent with the sovereign’s public trust
responsibilities. It may be objected that a limited system of capand-trade is better than no system of regulation at all. This is no
answer to the principled application of public trust limits to a
proposed system of allocated private ownership of the carbon
carrying capacity of the global atmosphere. Moreover, it is by no
means self-evident that a system of over-allocation of resource
exploitation rights is more resource protective than a system
without limits.
224
The experience with the 1976 Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Act
provides a close analogy. That act took a classic public trust
resource (fisheries) that, like the atmosphere, was previously
considered res communes (not susceptible of private ownership) and,
like every cap-and-trade proposal on the table, sought to forestall
the collapse of the resource by adoption of limits on the overall
225
catch and then allocating these limits to fishermen. Also, like the
cap-and-trade proposals under consideration, the MagnusonStevens Fisheries Act allowed the calculation of the overall fish
harvesting caps—the so-called “optimized yield”—to take into
account social and economic factors instead of basing the cap
223. An important issue that is beyond the scope of this Article is the relationship
between any potential United States cap-and-trade program and global nature of air
resources. Rather, this Article focuses on a domestic cap-and-trade system under United
States law. Some interesting issues that are not addressed are whether Congress can meet its
public trust obligations by enacting legislation that sets an appropriate cap for the United
States’ share of global greenhouse gas emissions, whether domestic compliance with
international agreements would be subject to public trust limitations, and who, if anyone,
could potentially enforce those limits.
224. Fishery, Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331
(1976).
225. Id. See generally Harry N. Scheiber & Christopher J. Carr, From Extended Jurisdiction to
Privatization: International Law, Biology, and Economics in the Marine Fisheries Debates, 1937–
1976, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 10, 53 (1998); Turnipseed et al., supra note 115, at 53–54;
Kathryn J. Mengerink, Comment, The Pew Oceans Commission Report: Navigating a Route to
Sustainable Seas, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 689, 708 (2004).
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solely on the biological sustainability of the fishery. The resulting
allocation of fish harvests by the so-called “fisheries management
227
councils” was far in excess of the carrying capacity of the fishery.
The result has been the collapse of the Atlantic ground fisheries
because fishing interests that benefited from maintaining current
228
allocations had political control of the fisheries councils.
GHG
cap-and-trade schemes under consideration have every indication
of following the Magnuson-Stevens’ Act’s failed approach, as the
legislation under consideration contemplates initial caps that are
based on easing the economic transition from the current fossilfuel based economy rather than any scientific measure of
sustainability.
Thus, under a public trust usufruct principle, a valid cap-andtrade program must set the overall cap at a low enough level to
support the global carrying capacity for GHGs.
3. Public Trust as an Interpretive Principle Precluding Vested
Rights
Even if public trust doctrine did not present a “hard,”
enforceable prohibition against a cap-and-trade system with excess
allocation of emissions rights, public trust principles may still
present an interpretive principle that will limit the scope of the
rights that private parties holding emissions rights may assert. One
of the principled objections to cap-and-trade programs is the
possibility that such private “rights to pollute” might, like other
forms of property, become vested over time so that government
could no longer restrict emissions rights without paying
compensation for taking the private property created by the
229
allocation scheme.
Some commentators have argued that
226. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(5) (2006).
227. See Scheiber & Carr, supra note 225; David A. Dana, Overcoming the Political Tragedy of
the Commons: Lessons Learned from the Reauthorization of the Magnuson Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q.
833, 833–46 (1997).
228. In response to the failure of the 1976 Act to prevent collapse of important fisheries,
the Magnuson Stevens Act was amended by the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act to change the
definition of “optimum yield” to limit the cap so that it cannot be greater than the
scientifically determined maximum sustained yield. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1802–1833 (2006).
229. See generally Justin Savage, Note, Confiscation of Emissions Reductions Credits: The Case
for Compensation Under the Takings Clause, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 227 (1997); Susan A. Austin,
Comment, Tradable Emissions Programs: Implications Under the Takings Clause, 26 ENVTL. L. 323
(1996); Yvonne F. Lindgren, Note, The Emissions Trading Policy: Smoke on the Horizon for
Takings Clause Claimants, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 667 (1991).
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tradable emissions rights are “property” that may not be abrogated
230
without compensation under the Takings Clause.
A system of allocated GHG emissions rights might create
“property”-based claims for compensation in two ways. First, an
allocation scheme might create an expectation of continued
allocations of emissions rights.
Second, and perhaps more
231
problematic, cap-and-trade schemes that permit “banking” may
create a property interest in the “banked” emissions credits, even if
it later becomes apparent that the banked emissions rights will
overwhelm measures necessary to avoid catastrophic global
warming.
Public trust doctrine provides an interpretive principle that
should avoid claims of vested property rights subject to
compensation. Even if public trust principles are not an absolute
limit on sovereign power to alienate trust resources, public trust
cases have consistently required that legislative actions claimed to
have alienated public trust assets to reflect an unambiguous intent.
Thus, in one of the leading state public trust decisions, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that unique state
parkland could not to be converted to uses inconsistent with the
232
trust “without plain and explicit legislation.” Similarly, in Shively
v. Bowlby, the United States Supreme Court applied public trust
principles to limit the scope of riparian ownership rights granted
by a pre-statehood congressional grant in Oregon territory,
presuming that Congress would not act to deprive future states of
public trust assets by granting sub-tidal lands to private owners.
Similar application of public trust principles should preclude any
claim that tradable emissions rights allocations, including “banked”
emissions rights, create a form of property for which compensation
would be required if future GHG allocation schemes require limits
more stringent than those adopted by a particular cap-and-trade
system.

230. See supra note 229.
231. Emissions “banking” allows holders of emissions rights to “bank” and reserve these
emissions credits for use (or sale) in later years. See generally Hahn & Lester, supra note 58, at
129–30.
232. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 121 (Mass. 1966). For
discussions of the public trust clear statement rule, see generally 1 W. RODGERS, JR.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 2.20, at 164 (1986); Michael C. Blumm, Public
Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine,
19 ENVTL. L. 573, 587–89 (1989).
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IV. CONCLUSION
A cap-and-trade system designed to limit or control global GHG
implicates public trust principles, since such a system would create
private rights in atmospheric resources that are contrary to the
Justinian concept that the air is not subject to private ownership.
While federal public trust doctrine has so far been applied only to
navigable and tidal waters, it draws its roots from the Justinian
concept of sovereignty, which supports the extension of the
doctrine of non-traditional public trust assets to the atmospheric
carrying capacity for GHGs. A federal public trust doctrine would
not preclude the establishment of a cap-and-trade program for
GHGs. There is a sustainability principle underlying public trust
doctrine, however, that precludes any cap-and-trade system that
allocates emissions rights in excess of those that can sustainably be
absorbed by the climate system. As all the cap-and-trade schemes
so far implemented or considered include a phase-in period during
which emissions rights exceed sustainable levels, all of these
proposals violate public trust principles.

